Thomas A. Beal, Orson H. Beal v. Mattie Beal Hansen : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs
1949
Thomas A. Beal, Orson H. Beal v. Mattie Beal
Hansen : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Unknown.
Dilworth Woolley; Attorney for Appellants.
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Thomas A. Beal, Orson H. Beal v. Mattie Beal Hansen, No. 19497369.00 (Utah Supreme Court, 1949).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_sc1/36
UT/\H UTAH SUPR:::t/1:::: COURT. 
DOCUM..:.NT 
KFU 
45.9 BRIEE 
.S9 
. ' 
DOCKET NO. ·' 
INDEX 
Page 
I. STATEMENT OF F ACfS. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 
II. ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
The Intention of Testator Controls. 
He intended to Will his Property to the Kind-
red of the Full Blood and to Exclude his Kind-
red of the Half Blood . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
Point 2 
Testacy Preferred over Intestacy. . . . . . . . . . . 16 
Point 3 
Death in Common Disaster not Condition. . . . 18 
STATUTES CITED 
Sec. 101-4-5, subdiv. ( 4), Utah Code Annotated, 1943. . 4 
101-4-17, Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 
101-2-1, Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 
101-2-10, Code . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 
CASES AND TEXTS CITED 
Page 
Fitzgerald v. Ayers, __ Tex. __ , Civ. App. __ 
189 s. w. 289................................ 19 
In re Hardie's Estate, 26 N.Y. S. 2d, 333, 176 Misc. 21 13 
Glover v. Reynolds, 135 N.J. Eq. 113, 37 A. 2d 90..... 12 
Re: Kenny's Will, 224 App. Div. 152. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 
In re Popleton's Estate, 34 Utah 285, 97 Pac. 138. . . . . . 6 
SkipWith v. Cabell, 19 Gratt. (Va.) 758.............. 8 
Walker v. Hibbard, 185 Ky. 795, 215 S. W. 800, 11 A. 
L. R. 833.................................... 11 
Young Women's Christian Home v. French, 187 U. S. 
401, 47 L. Ed. 233, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 184, 43 A. L. 
R. 1350 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . 9 
Re: J. Clark Tinsley's Will, __ Ia. __ , 174 N. W. 
4, 11 A. L. R. 826............................. 10 
Re: Searl's Est., _____ Wash. ___ , 186 P. 2d 913, 173 
A. L. R. 1247................................ 12 
G8 C. J., Page 6:-w, Sec. 256 ...................... 11, 18 
11 A. L. R. 858.................................. 8 
4:3 A. L. R. 1350. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS 
1. The court erred in overruling appelants' motion for a 
decree distributing the estate of the deceased accord-
ing to the provisions of paragraph 5 of the will. 
2. The court erred in decreeing distribution of the residue 
of said estate according to the laws of succession and 
not according to the provisions of the will; and the de-
cree of final distribution is contrary to law. 
3. The decree of final distribution is not supported by the 
facts found. 
4. The court erred in its conclusion of law that paragraph 
5 of the will of the deceased is inoperative and does not 
apply in this proceeding and does not govern the distri-
bution of this estate and that the estate must be dis-
tributed in accordance with the laws of succession of 
this state. 
In the Supreme Court of the 
State of Utah 
IN THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE 
of 
Thomas A. Beal, sometimes known 
as T. A. Beal, Deceased. 
CASE 
NO. 7369 
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Robert H. Harden, Jr., Grace H. Ross, Ida Beal Nielson, 
George Beal, Mary Beal Noyes, Milton Beal, Ralph Beal, 
Henry E. Beal, LeoN. Beal, GeorgeS. Beal, Clare B. Tuttle, 
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Beal Wilcox, Evelyn Olsen, Shirley Olsen, Berdie Olsen, 
Carie Amelia P. Tanner, and Berdella B. Evans as adminis-
tratrix with the will annexed of Thomas A. Beal deceased, 
Respondents. 
This is an appeal from the decree of final distribution 
made and entered in the matter of the estate of Thomas 
A. Beal, deceased, on June 13, 1949. 
The appellants are all of the relatives of the full blood 
of Thomas A. Beal and his wife, Ida Peterson Beal, except 
one of the latter, who claim the estate under paragraph 5 
of the will; while the list of respondents includes all of the 
relatives of the half blood of Thomas A. Beal, who share 
in the distribution with his relatives of the whole blood 
under the statutes of succession as in cases of intestacy, and 
also the administratrix of the estate with the will annexed 
and the one Peterson legatee who does not join in the ap-
peal. 
At the time the petition for settlement of final account 
and for final distribution of the residue of the estate to the 
v~rsons entitled thereto came on for hearing before the 
') 
d 
court, the persons who are joined as appellants appeared 
in the probate proceeding and moved for an order and de-
cree setting aside the residue to them, and the one who 
does not join them, under paragraph 5 of the will. This 
motion was resisted by one of the Beal relatives of the half 
blood. The court overruled the motion, and decreed a dis-
tribution under the laws of succession. Notice of appeal 
has been served upon all persons whose interests will be ad-
versely affected by a reversal of the decree. 
We assign error on the part of the lower court in over-
ruling our motion for a decree of distribution in accordance 
with the will, in decreeing a distribution according to the 
laws of succession, and in failing and refusing to decree a 
distribution in accordance with the will; and claim that the 
decree as made is contrary to law and is not supported by 
the facts. 
We invoke a decision of this court upon the question 
whether or not the residue of the estate shall be distributed 
in accordance with paragraph 5 of the will of the deceased. 
I. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
There is no dispute regarding the controlling facts, 
which are disclosed in the findings made by the lower court. 
We accept as true the facts found; but the following state-
ment, to be found in paragraph 10 of the findings, we re-
gard as a conclusion of law, and erroneous at that, and 
shall treat it accordingly: 
"and the provisions of paragraph 'Fifth' thereof are 
inoperative, do not apply herein, do not govern the dis-
tribution of his Estate, and cannot be given any force 
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or effect; and that the residue of property in said es-
tate available for distribution . must be dis-
tributed . . . . in accordance with the laws of 
succession of the State of Utah." 
When Thomas A. Beal made his will his wife, Ida 
Peterson Beal, was living. They were residents of this state. 
They had no children or issue, father or mother living. 
Both had many brothers and sisters of the half blood and 
nieces and nephews who are children of deceased brothers 
and sisters of the half blood. Also at that time Thomas A. 
Beal had seven brothers and sisters of the Whole blood, or 
there were children of such of them as had died leaving 
children; and Ida Peterson Beal had three brothers and sis-
ters of the whole blood, or there were children of such of 
them as had died leaving children. So that if the wife 
should predecease her husband and he should die intestate, 
the succession would fall to his kindred of the half as well 
as of the whole blood. (Sec. 101-4-5, subdiv. ( 4), and Sec. 
101.-4-17, Utah Code Annotated, 1943.) While if the wife 
should outlive the husband and then die intestate, the suc-
cession would be to her kindred of the half and whole blood. 
Thomas A. Beal made his will on March 13, 1941. He 
died January 3, 1948. His wife, Ida Peterson Beal, died 
January 6, 1945. The will was admitted to probate and 
letters of administration with the will annexed were issued 
to Berdella B. Evans March 20, 1948. 
The following is a copy of the will: 
"LAST WILL AND TESTAMENT 
I, Thomas A. Beal, of the City & County of Salt 
Lake, State of Utah, being of sound mind and mem-
ory do make, publish and declare this to be my last 
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Will and Testament, hereby revoking any other will 
or testamentary disposition heretofore made by me. 
First- I direct that all my just debts and funeral 
expenses be paid by my Executrix, hereinafter named, 
and that my body be buried decently in accordance 
with the condition of my estate, and that simple, per-
manent stone mark my grave. 
Second - I give and bequeath to the School of 
Business of the University of Utah all my professional 
library at the University and to the Snow College all 
my professional books at home, not including family 
records, books of account, or books of a religious na-
ture. 
Third - I give, devise and bequeath all the rest, 
residue and remainder of my property, both real and 
personal, of whatsoever kind the same may be, or 
wheresoever situated, including estates of inheritance 
of which I may die possessed, or to which I may be 
entitled to Ida Peterson Beal, my wife, to have and to 
hold the same to the said Ida Peterson Beal and her 
assigns forever. 
Fourth - I nominate and appoint the said Ida 
Peterson Beal the Executrix of this, my last Will and 
Testament, to act without bond. 
Fifth - In the event that my wife and I shall 
perish in a common catastrophe, or disaster, then, and 
in such event, I give, devise, and bequeath to the Presi-
dent of the University of Utah for the School of Busi-
ness the sum of $500.00, and to the President of Snow 
College ·for the Snow College a like amount, for the 
purchase of books in Business and Economics, for the 
use and benefit of said schools in building up their li-
braries. And in such case of death, I give, devise, and 
bequeath all the rest, residue, and remainder of my 
property, both real and personal, of whatever kind the 
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same may be, or wherever situated, or to which I may 
be entitled, to my nearest of kin and my wife's nearest 
of kin. That is to say, to our brothers and sisters, of 
the full blood, share and share alike, it being under-
stood that the children of any said brother or sister 
now dead, or who may predecease us, shall stand in the 
place of such deceased brother or sister and take a 
one-tenth interest in the remainder therein devised and 
bequeathed. Further, in such case, I nominate and ap-
point Carvel Mattson the Executor of my last Will and 
Testament, to serve without bond, and I hereby revoke 
any and all former wills by me made. 
In Witness Whereof, I have hereunto set my hand 
and seal this Thirteenth Day of March, 1941. 
Thomas A. Beal." 
II. 
ARGUMENT 
Point 1 
The cardinal rule of construction in all will cases is 
that the will must be construed in accordance with the in-
tention of the testator. 
Section 101-2-1, Code, 1943, reads: 
"A will must be construed according to the inten-
tion of the testator. Where his intention cannot have 
effect to its full extent, it must have effect as far as 
possible." 
This rule permeates all other rules and is. to have full 
weight in all circumstances. 
Mr. Justice Frick, in In re Popleton's Estate, 34 Utah 
285, 97 Pac. 138, gives emphasis to the importance of this 
rule in the following language: 
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"This section controls all other sections in which 
rules of construction are given, in that no rule provi-
ded for is to be given force and effect except for the 
purpose of ascertaining the real intention of the tes-
tator as expressed by him. This is the ultimate ob-
ject to be kept in mind and to which all rules must 
yield. Rules of construction, therefore, are to be re-
sorted to as mere aids or guides for the purpose of at-
taining the ultimate object, namely, the real intention 
of the testator." 
If we read -this will with the foregoing rule in mind 
we find little difficulty in discovering what Thomas A. Beal 
intended with respect to the disposition of his property 
upon his death. 
It is clear that the testator had in mind as the objects 
of his bounty (1) The University of Utah and Snow Col-
lege, (2) his wife, and (3) the kindred of the full blood of 
himself and wife; and it is likewise clear that he did not in-
tend that his kindred of the half blood should take any part 
of his estate, who would inherit if he should die intestate. 
His intention in regard to the University and College is 
clearly expressed that they should take his professional 
books, and, also, as we think, that each should take $500.00 
additional in case he and his wife should die in a common 
disaster or she should predecease him. It is likewise clear 
beyond all question that he intended that his wife should 
take all of his property, except his books, if she survived 
him. Having expressed such intention in the first part of 
his will, he next came to a consideration of what should be 
done with the estate should she not be living at his death 
or should they meet death in a common disaster. Death 
of both husband and wife in a common disaster, especially' 
on the . public highways, is not an uncommon happening. 
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A glance at the headlines in the newspapers any morning 
will remind one of such events. Now, the significance of 
the expression "death in a common disaster" in this will 
is this: That in such event, absent some provision in the 
will, the estate would probably be succeeded to by his rela-
tives under the laws of succession. But since he did not 
want the half bloods to inherit and did want his estate to 
go to his and her relatives of the whole blood in case she 
did not survive him to take under paragraph 3, he was 
prompted to write paragraph 5 of the will to make sure 
that if such a thing should happen the property would go 
to them. He was not thinking of death in a common dis-
aster as a condition upon which the property should vest 
in them. The only condition which he had in mind was 
that his wife should not outlive him to need his property. 
The contingency referred to in paragraph 5 is the reason or 
occasion for making the disposition and was never intended 
to be a condition upon which the disposition is to become 
effective. In Skipwith v. Cabell (1870) 19 Gratt. (Va.) 
758, which is summarized in 11 A. L. R. 858, it appeared 
that a woman made a will disposing of her property and 
then added a codicil providing: "In case of a sudden and 
unexpected death, I give the remainder of my property to 
be equally divided between my cousin, Dr. Carter of Phila-
delphia, and my cousin Peyton Skipwith of New Orleans, 
one half of which each must hold in trust for the benefit of 
their children." The contention was made that the legacy 
depended upon the sudden and unexpected death of testat-
rix, and that, since this did not occur, nothing passed by 
the bequest. The court, however, holds this was not a con-
ditional legacy, saying: 
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"In cases of this sort, the question to be deter-
mined is whether the contingency is referred to as the 
reason or occasion for making the disposition, or as the 
condition upon which the disposition is to become op-
erative. . . . . Upon the whole, it seems clear 
that such expressions as those used in this clause could 
not properly be construed as creating a condition un-
less accompanid by other language so clear as to admit 
of no other interpretation. They are not so accompa-
nied in the present case, and, without putting the slight-
est strain upon the language, we can understand it as 
designed only to express the reason which led the tes-
tatrix to dispose of the residue at the time, and to avoid 
risk of future delay." 
Another similar case is Young Women's Christian 
Home v. French (1903), 187 U. S. 401, 47 L. ed. 233, 23 Sup. 
Ct. Rep. 187. The case is cited in a note in 43 A. L. R., page 
1350. 
In that case it appeared that a woman gave half of her 
estate to her husband for life, with remainder to the Young 
Women's Christian Home, and the other half to her son, 
with the provision that 
"in the event of my becoming the survivor" 
of both husband and son, the entire estate should go to the 
Young Women's Christian Home. The testator and her 
husband and son perished in a common disaster, under cir-
cumstances affording no evidence of survivorship. 
Holding that the estate did not fall into intestacy, but 
passed under the will to the Young Women's Christian 
Home, the court said: 
"Reading this will from the standpoint of the tes-
tatrix, as we must, we think it not open to doubt that 
10 
she intended to dispose of all her estate, and did not 
intend to die intestate as to any part of it; that she had 
in mind only three objects of her bounty, her husband, 
her son, and the Home, and that her intention, failing 
husband and son, was that the Home should take. If 
husband alone survived, it was to go to the Home at 
his death. If neither husband nor son survived it was 
to go to the Home at once. Is her manifest intention 
to be defeated because, instead of saying: 'If neither 
my husband nor my son should survive me, I give and 
bequeath my property to the Home,' she said, 'In the 
event of my becoming the survivor of both my hus-
band Oliver Wheeler Rhodes, and of my son, Eugene 
Rhodes, I give and bequeath all my property to the 
iYbung Women's Christian Home?' We do not feel com-
pelled to so hold, and, by accepting so technical and 
literal a view, to reach a result on the theory of a 
change in the burden of proof, or of an accidental omis-
sion to prevent it. This is not a case of supplying some-
thing omitted by oversight, but of intention sufficiently 
expressed to be carried out on the actual state of facts 
. We think, upon principle, that the proper-
ty of Mrs. Rhodes should go as directed if she survived 
her son, in the absence of proof to the contrary." 
Still another similar case is In Re Probate of Will of 
J. Clark Tinsley, Deceased, Iowa , 174 N. W. 
4, 11 A. L. R. 826, in which the testator was about to un-
dertake a journey to California and made this will: 
"In case of any serious accident, after my just 
debts are paid, I direct that my aunt, Miss Mary E. 
Clark take entire charge of my estate as she sees fit." 
In answer to an objection that this was no will since 
no serious accident occurred, the court said: 
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"It may well be that the contemplation of a long 
journey, and its possible dangers and exposures, sug-
gested to the mind of the deceased the wisdom of pro-
viding for the succession to his estate in the event of 
his death, and that, acting upon this thought, he pre-
pared the paper in question. This would indicate no 
more than that the circumstances mentioned were the 
occasion for his act, and not at all that his death while 
on that trip was a contingency without which the will 
would not become operative." 
In 68 C. J., page 630,' Section 256, under the title 
"Wills," subtitle "Contingent Wills," is found a statement 
of the general rule which we think is applicable in cases of 
this kind and to this case in particular, as follows: 
"Whether a will is to be regarded as contingent 
turns upon the point whether the contingency is re-
ferred to merely as the occasion of or reason for mak-
ing the will at the time it is made, or is referred to as 
the reason for making the particular disposition of 
property which is provided for, and is intended to spec-
ify the condition upon which the will is to become op-
erative, it being only in the latter case that the will is 
contingent. 
"Unless the terms of the will clearly show that it 
was intended to be contingent, it will be regarded as 
absolute and unconditional." 
In the notes to the paragraph from which the above 
is quoted will be found many cases on both sides of the ques-
tion to be decided in this case. In speaking of such. cases 
the supreme court of Kentucky, in Walker v. Hibbard, 185 
Ky. 795, 215 S. W. 800, 11 A. L. R. 833, remarks: 
"It will be seen from the description of the two 
classes of wills that the distinction between them is so 
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narrow that it is often difficult to decide in which class 
the paper in question should fall, and in some cases this 
has influenced courts to attach importance to the re-
lations the beneficiary bore to the tetsator, and to lean 
towards that construction most favorable to the natu-
ral objects of his bounty." 
There is no way in which the cases upon the subject 
can be reconciled. They will fall upon one side of the line 
or the other for reasons peculiar to themselves, unless the 
language is so clear and explicit as to admit of no doubt 
whatsoever. 
In re Searl's Estate, Wash. , 186 P. 2d 
913, 173 A. L. R. 1247, is against our side, or so it seems. 
In that case the husband's will gave his estate to his 
wife with the provision that in the event that they should 
meet death "by accident or otherwise at the same time or 
approximately the same time," the estate should go to his 
wife's sister. The wife died May 19, 1945, and the husband 
July 5, 1945. The court held that they did not die at the 
same time or approximately the same time, hence this pro-
vision was not operative, and distributed the husband's es-
tate under the laws of succession. The court spends most 
of its writing on the meaning of the word "approximate" 
and leans heavily on Glover v. Reynolds, 135 N. J. Eq. 113, 
37 A 2d 90, which is another case apparently in favor of 
the other side. 
We feel that the courts in those two cases have not 
been as mindful as they should have been about giving force 
to the manifest intention of the testators. The opinions 
strike this writer as being too literal, too strict, in their 
construction of the instruments under consideration. 
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The opinion in the Washington case does not ring true. 
It gives forth a hollow sound. One has the feeling, when 
reading it, that the writer thereof felt convinced from read-
ing the will that the testator intended his wife's sister to 
have the property in the circumstance which developed but 
that the court could not give it to her because the testator 
had not said so in unmistakable laguage. The opinion gives 
too much weight to mere words and not enough to ideas, 
for which words are mere symbols. 
Against the two cases last mentioned, we place the case 
of Re Hardie (1941) 176 Misc. 21, 26 N. Y. S. 2d 333, af-
firmed without opinion in (1942) 263 App. Div. 927, 33 N. 
Y. S. 2d 389, appeal denied (1942) 263 App. Div. 1061, 34 
N. Y. S. 2d 816. 
In that case it appears that Charles G. Hardie died Oc-
tober 18, 1940, leaving a will in which he first gives all his 
estate to his wife absolutely and forever; and then goes on 
to say: 
"Third: In the event that my said wife, Nettie 
M. Hardie, shall die simultaneously with me, or her 
death shall closely follow my demise, either as the re-
sult of accident or illness of any kind whatsoever, then 
and in that event, it is my will and I direct my estate 
shall be disposed of as follows," to certain charities and 
a relative. 
The wife predeceased the husband, dying on August 
18, 1939. 
It was claimed by relatives that this will was condi-
tional, and they moved for dismissal of the probate thereof. 
The Surrogate's opinion sustaining the will, which was of-
firmed by all of the appellate courts of the state, is apt to 
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the case at bar. The case cannot be distinguished, really, 
from the case at bar; for in that case the husband and wife 
did not die simultaneously and her death did not closely 
follow his demise; but she died first, just as Ida Peterson 
Beal predeceased her husband. We quote from that opin-
ion: 
"It is evident that Charles Hardie did not de-
sire to die intestate, else he would not have made a 
will, or having made it, he would have destroyed or re-
voked it. It is also evident that he did not intend to 
make his relatives the object of his bounty in the event 
of his dying simultaneously with his wife. This being 
apparent and clearly reflecting the attitude of the tes-
tator toward his relatives, is it not reasonable to pre-
sume that this was his attitude and his feelings in any 
event, and particularly under the situation as it sub-
sequently developed? Having designated his benefi-
ciaries under his will, it does not appear to me that 
Charles Hardie chose these beneficiaries only in the 
event of his dying simultaneously with his wife. I be-
lieve he intended them to be his beneficiaries in any 
event and if he had any intention to the contrary, he 
could and would have made another will for he lived 
fourteen months after the death of his wife." 
So in the case at bar we say it is evident that Thomas 
A. Beal did not intend to die intestate, else he would not 
have made his will, or having made it, he would have de-
stroyed or revoked it. It is also evident that he did not 
intend to make his relatives of the half blood the objects of 
his bounty and that he did intend to bestow his estate, ex-
cept for his books, upon his wife and upon his and her rela-
tives of the full blood, in case they died in a common dis-
aster so that she would have no need for his property. Thi~; 
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being his attitude toward his wife and his relatives of the 
half and the whole blood and her relatives of the whole 
blood, is it not reasonable to presume that this was his at-
titude and feeling in any event, and particularly under the 
situation as it subsequently developed, where she died first? 
Having designated his beneficiaries under his will, it does 
not seem to us that Thomas A. Beal chose those benefici-
aries only in the event of his dying at the same time as his 
wife in a common disaster. It seems to us that he inten-
ded them to be his beneficiaries in any event, when his wife 
no longer needed his estate, and if he intended anything to 
the contrary, he would have made another will, or revoked 
or destroyed this one. 
The surrogate also quotes from In Matter of Kenny's 
Will, 224 App. Div. 152, at page 156, 230 N. Y. S. 74-78, 
affirmed without opinion by the court of appeals in 25 N. 
Y. 594, 166 N. E. 337, regarding the latitude which the 
courts have in giving construction to wills so as to make 
them express the intention of the testator, as follows: 
"On the other hand, great latitude is given to 
courts to render effective imperfectly expressed testa-
mentary intention. (Citing cases.) Courts may, it is 
true, transpose words ·and phrases, and read the pro-
visions of a will in an order different from that in which 
they appear in the instrument, insert or leave out pro-
visions if necessary, but only in aid of the testator's in-
tent and purpose; never to devise a new scheme or 
make a new will. (Citing cases.) In the interpretation 
of a will the consideration of paramount importance is 
to discover the intention of the testator, as expressed 
in the will, and all other rules for the interpretation of 
wills are subordinate to the requirement that the inten-
tion of the testator should be sought and given effect, 
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when that may lawfully be done. (Citing cases.) There 
is another subordinate canon of construction which 
has some bearing on the construction of this instru-
ment, viz., that, between two possible constructions, 
that is to be preferred which avoids intestacy. (Citing 
cases.) 
"I am of the opinion it was the intention of the 
testator that his estate be disposed of as set forth in 
the will in the event that he and his wife died simul-
taneously or in the event that she predeceased him." 
We believe this case from the state of New York is a 
more weighty authority than the two cases above men-
tioned which reach contrary results on similar facts. 
Point 2 
There is another rule for construction of wills which 
has a bearing in this case. It is found in Section 101-2-10, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1943, which reads as follows: 
"Of two modes of interpreting a will, that is to be 
preferred which will prevent a total intestacy." 
The interpretation made by the lower court has resul-
ted in a virtual intestacy; the property has been ordered 
distributed to the heirs at law of Thomas A. Beal who would 
take if he had made no will whatever. This result would 
have been avoided and the will sustained if the court had 
limited the provision relative to death in a common disaster 
to the bequests of $500.00 each to the university and Snow 
College. The punctuation of the paragraph will support 
such limitation. The testator says in his will "In the event 
that my wife and I shall perish in a common catastrophe, 
or disasto:r, then, and in such event, I give, devise, and be-
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queath to the President of the University of Utah for the 
School of Business the swn of $500.00, and to the President 
of Snow College for Snow College a like amount, for the 
purchase of books in Business and Economics, for the use 
and benefit of said Schools in building up their libraries." 
Period. 
That is one complete thought. If the court should feel 
that death in a common disaster must be held to be a con-
dition precedent to the vesting of any bequest made in para-
graph 5, then let that condition be limited to those two be-
quests to the schools. Let it then be held that the testator 
intended to increase his bounty to the schools only in the 
event that he and his wife should meet death in a common 
disaster, and that, since they did not so perish, such pro-
vision to educational purposes cannot be given effect. But 
why extend that condition to the next provision in para-
graph 5? It does not appear to be necessary to do so. The 
language used does not require such interpretation. Hav-
ing expressed his will with respect to his professional books 
and the educational institutions which he wanted to make 
the recipients of his bounty, he goes on to say: "And in 
such case of death," which means in case of the death of 
himself and his wife either in a common disaster, under 
circumstances in which it might be impossible to say which 
died first, or in case she died before he did and no longer 
had need of his property, then his estate is to go to the 
brothers and sisters of the whole blood. Such an interpre-
tation will give effect to all provisions of the will and will 
result in harmonizing the decree with the statute above 
set forth. The words "And in such case of death" do not 
have such a specific and definite meaning that they must 
in this case be held to include all the thoughts which are 
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embraced in the words "In the event that my wife and I 
shall perish in a common catastrophe, or disaster." They 
could very well be held to include only the thought that in 
the event that his wife and he should both perish or die so 
that she would not take under paragraph 3 of the will, then 
he wanted his estate to go to the relatives of both of the 
whole blood. 
Point 3 
Death in a common disaster is not a condition prece-
dent to the taking effect of paragraph 5 of the will. 
In addition to the cases and authorities cited above in 
which this subject is discussed, we submit the following. 
In 68 C. J., page 630, Section 256, under the title 
"Wills," subtitle "Contingent Wills," and cases listed under 
notes 70 (b) and 70 (c), the subject is quite fully treated. 
The following sentence is quoted from the' text: 
"Unless the terms of the will clearly show that it 
was intended to be contingent, it will be regarded as 
absolute and unconditional." 
We respectfully submit to this court the proposition 
that there is no word, phrase, clause or sentence in this 
will which clearly shows that Thomas A. Beal intended his 
will or paragraph 5 thereof to be contingent upon the hap-
pening of the event therein mentioned. The intent to make 
paragraph 5 contingent upon the happening of the event 
must affirmatively appear in the will. If upon reading the 
whole will and placing paragraph 3 alongside paragraph 5, 
the court has any doubt whether the testator intended the 
event to be a condition upon which paragraph 5 is to be ef-
fective, then, under the authorities which we have cited, 
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and in hannony with the principles above laid down for the 
interpretation of wills, paragraph 5 should be upheld. 
Fitzgerald v. Ayers, (1915) Tex. Civ. 
App ___ , 189 S. W. 289, is a case which illustrates how 
the courts regard similar provisions. In that case it appears 
that the husband and wife both made wills. He gave his 
property to his wife if she survived him, she gave her prop-
erty to him if he survived her, and both named their son 
as legatee in the event of the prior death of the spouse. 
Both died under circumstances raising no inference as 
to survivorship; so it could not be said that either survived 
the other. 
The court held, nevertheless, that the son took under 
both wills because it was manifestly the intention of the 
testators that the son should have the property; it was 
very plain to the court that it was not the intention of eith-
er testator to make the device to the son depend upon a 
condion precedent which would admit of the property go-
ing to a third person. The court said: 
"It was not the intention of either Mr. Skinner or 
Mrs. Skinner to make the device of their property to 
their adopted son, Carnagie Frank Skinner, depend 
upon a condition precedent which would admit of the 
property going to third persons." 
So we say in this case it was not the intention of this 
testator to make the device to the relatives of the whole 
blood of himself and his wife depend upon a condition that 
both should perish in a common disaster, for it is apparent 
from a reading of the whole will that he intended them to 
take his property if the wife were not living to take it when 
the will should become effective by his death. 
20 
The same reason which impelled the Texas court to 
sustain the device in the case last cited should prompt this 
court, we submit, to sustain the bequest in this case. 
Since, as we have shown, the lower court erred in dis-
regarding paragraph 5 of the will and distributing the resi-
due of the estate of the deceased to the persons who would 
inherit the same if there were no will at all, thus in effect 
holding that the deceased died intestate, which is some-
thing which he manifestly did not intend to do, we respect-
fully submit that the decree for final distribution should be 
set aside and the lower court directed to enter a decree dis-
tributing the residue of the estate to the persons entitled 
thereto under paragraph 5 of the will. Appellants should 
also be awarded their costs. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DILWORTH WOOLLEY 
Attorney for Appellants. 
